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NEW RESTRICTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION:
STANDING AND FINAL AGENCY ACTION AFTER
L UJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE
FEDERATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The impetus behind federal legislation relating to protection
of the environment was the realization by Congress that state leg-
islation and the common law were insufficiently addressing the
significant and pressing health risks posed by pollution.' Simi-
larly, Congress recognized that the steady destruction and ex-
ploitation of public lands threatened the public health and
welfare as well as the future of the nation.2 It was in response to
1. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 101-403, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988). In
section 101 of the Clean Air Act, Congress finds "that Federal financial assist-
ance and leadership is essential for the development of cooperative Federal,
State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air pollution." 42
U.S.C. § 7401. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act shows that Congress
perceived air pollution as "a serious national problem" which required "appro-
priate action." H.R. REP. No. 508, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1260. This action took the form of the Clean Air
Act which "completely revised existing law and made more explicit the authority
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare," a federal agency. Id.
Congress also instituted two new programs to further its objectives. The first
consisted of federal grants to state, regional, and local air pollution control
agencies. The second consisted of federal assistance and participation in air pol-
lution abatement actions. Id. See also infra note 2.
2. Section 102 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
sets forth the policy of the Act. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988). This policy states that:
(1) the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless .... it is
determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national
interest;...
(6) judicial review of public land adjudication decisions be provided by
law;...
(8) the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the qual-
ity of scientific, scenic, historical, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will
preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that
will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals;
and that will provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and
use;...
(12) the public lands be managed in a manner which recognizes the
Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber
from the public lands including implementation of the Mining and Min-
erals Policy Act of 1970 ....
Id.
These objectives reflect the congressional intent indicated in the legislative his-
tory to create a coherent system of public land laws which will balance environ-
(227)
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these latter concerns that Congress enacted the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) of 19693 and the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). 4 In accordance with the
general congressional intent underlying federal environmental
legislation, the federal courts, in accordance with United States
Supreme Court guidance,5 have applied a liberal interpretation of
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 6
mental goals with the nation's need for natural resources and to avoid both
excessive disposal of public lands as well as excessive restrictions on public
lands. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6175-77.
Section 2 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) sets
forth the Act's purpose:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and en-
joyable harmony between man and his environment to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and bio-
sphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the un-
derstanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important
to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
Section 101 of the Act sets forth the Congressional policy in enacting NEPA:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on
... the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of
[inter alia] ... resource exploitation.., and recognizing... the critical
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the
overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the contin-
uing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and
local governments, and other concerned public and private organiza-
tions, to use all practicable means and measures ... to foster and pro-
mote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future genera-
tions of Americans.
Id. § 4331.
The legislative history of NEPA reveals that Congress viewed environmental
degradation as a serious problem which required immediate attention. H.R.
REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2754.
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-
4361 (1988).
4. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 §§ 10 1-707, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701-1784 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(where Court found that judicial review is available except with respect to
agency actions and decisions which are committed to agency discretion by law.
Court found that this exception to judicial review represented narrow exception
and thereby broadened scope of judicial review under APA).
6. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 1-10(e), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988)
[hereinafter APA]. When an environmental statute does not expressly provide
for judicial review, judicial review is generally available under the APA. Section
10(a) of the APA provides a right of judicial review to any "person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.. ." Id. § 10(a), 5 U.S.C.
§ 702.
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Historically, the Supreme Court has upheld this congressionally-
born philosophy of expanding judicial review to facilitate a super-
visory role over agencies by private citizens and citizen organiza-
tions.7 In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,8 the Supreme Court
placed new restrictions on procedural requirements relating to
standing and final agency action under the APA9 which will cir-
cumscribe the ability of environmental groups to challenge
agency actions. The Court concluded that the injury must be spe-
cifically alleged, that is, the environmental group member must
assert use and/or enjoyment of the specific land threatened by
agency action' ° whereas previously, use and/or enjoyment of
land in the vicinity of the threatened land was sufficient."l The
Court reiterated that standing to challenge agency decisions is
limited to final agency action and significantly tailored the defini-
tion of final agency action to consist solely of those actions which
flow directly from a particular agency regulation.' 2 These
Supreme Court conclusions will have an impact on how an envi-
ronmental group must allege injury in order to survive summary
judgment and on what constitutes agency action within the scope
of challenge. There is a question as to whether these newly for-
mulated procedural requirements set forth by the Supreme Court
are consistent with congressional intent and precedent regarding
judicial review of environmental agency decisions. This restric-
tive approach toward environmental litigation may reflect the
conservatism which increasingly characterizes the constituency of
the Supreme Court and may be an early indicator of what the
Court will demand of environmental litigants in the coming
decades.
Section 10(c) of the APA states that judicial review is limited to "agency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action .... Id. § 10(c), 5
U.S.C. § 704.
7. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), infra notes 15-22 and
accompanying text; United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Proce-
dures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) [hereinafter SCRAP], infra notes 23-28 and accompa-
nying text.
8. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), rev k National Wildlife Federation v.
Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Lujan].
9. See supra note 6.
10. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-88.
11. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-90 (holding that allegation of use of surround-
ing lands was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact under section 10(a) of APA);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 (1973) (holding environmental
group must allege that challenged action will adversely affect organization
and/or individual members by asserting use of lands in issue).
12. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
1991] 229
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Standing Under the APA Before Lujan
Section 10(a) of the APA requires that a challenger of a fed-
eral agency action must be "adversely affected or aggrieved" by
the agency action.'i This requirement establishes standing for
purposes of the APA. 14 In Sierra Club v. Morton,15 a conservation
organization sought to restrain federal officials from approving a
ski resort in a national forest. 16 The Court expanded on its previ-
ous holding that requisite injury to establish standing under the
APA consisted of alleging an injury-in-fact where that injury re-
lated to an interest within the zone of interests which the statute
at issue sought to protect.' 7 In Sierra Club the Court affirmed the
principle that destruction or degradation of scenery and wildlife
which would impair future use and enjoyment of the park was suf-
ficient to establish injury-in-fact under section 10(a).1 8 The Court
proceeded to clarify the injury-in-fact test, stating that it required
that the challenger must be among those injured.' 9 In short, the
conservation organization could acquire representational stand-
ing only by alleging that some or all of its members actually used
the national forest for recreational or other purposes. 20 These
13. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Section 10(a) provides that "a person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." Id.
14. Standing satisfies the constitutional case or controversy requirement of
Article III. U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2, cl. 2. To establish standing, plaintiff must
show a personal stake in the outcome of the case. This is accomplished by show-
ing injury in fact. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 2.12, 74 (1983).
15. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
16. Id. at 728-30. This case represents the first time that the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in regard to environmental or-
ganization plaintiffs who allege a noneconomic injury.
17. See companion cases, Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (holding that standing to
obtain judicial review under APA was established where plaintiffs alleged that
challenged action caused injury-in-fact and where that alleged injury was to in-
terest which was within zone of interests which statute sought to protect).
18. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734. The Court also noted that environmental
interests are often shared by many individuals rather than just a few and that this
fact does not defeat standing. Id.
19. Id. at 735. The ultimate goal of this requirement was to attain consis-
tency with the constitutional requirement of having a direct stake in the outcome
of the case and to ensure that judicial review was predicated on real injury rather
than mere value preferences. Id. at 740.
20. Id. at 735. Representational standing allows organizations to sue for
injured members. An organization may properly allege representational stand-
ing "so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make
4
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members would then allegedly suffer -the direct injury that section
10(a) requires forjudicial review.2 1 Because the petitioner "failed
to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their
activities or pastimes" by the proposed development, the Court
held that petitioner failed to assert injury-in-fact, and therefore
lacked standing to challenge the development.22
One year later, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),23 the standing issue with regard to en-
vironmental lawsuits again came before the Court. 24 In this suit,
environmental groups sought to enjoin enforcement of Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) orders which allowed railroads to
collect surcharges on freight rates.2 5 Fearing that this surcharge
would discourage the use of recyclable materials and thereby ad-
versely affect the environment, SCRAP and other environmental
groups alleged that the ICC violated section 102(2)(c) of NEPA
by failing to file a detailed environmental impact statement before
issuing these orders. 26 In its complaint, SCRAP asserted that its
members used the forests, streams, mountains, and other re-
sources in the Washington metropolitan area for recreational
purposes and that such use would be affected by the negative en-
vironmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods
which would result from the rate increase.2 7 The Supreme Court
held that these allegations sufficiently established standing under
the APA to survive a motion to dismiss.28
Thus, after Sierra Club and SCRAP it was apparent that in or-
der to gain judicial review under the APA, an environmental or-
ganization was required to assert that the agency action would
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolu-
tion of the cause ...." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
21. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735.
22. Id. at 741. However, the Court reiterated that aesthetic and environ-
mental well-being as well as economic well-being can constitute injury. Id. at
734.
23. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 676. The plaintiffs claimed that because the 2.5% surcharge
would also apply to the shipment of recyclables, the surcharge would discourage
the use of recyclable materials and encourage the use of new raw materials which
adversely affect the environment via mining, lumbering and other activities. The
environmental group members alleged that they would be forced to pay more
for finished products and that their use of forests and streams would be im-
paired due to the exploitive activities. United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 346 F. Supp. 189, 192-95 (D.D.C. 1972).
26. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 676.
27. Id. at 685.
28. Id. at 689-90.
2311991]
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adversely affect its members' use of public lands. In short, where
use was asserted, standing was established.
B. Final Agency Action Before Lujan
In addition to lack of standing, judicial review may be denied
on the basis of untimeliness.2 9 Untimeliness may be present
where the agency action is not ripe for review,30 where the agency
action is not final3' or where administrative remedies have not
been exhausted.3 2 These separate concepts can be closely related
and may overlap.33 Section 10(c) of the APA provides that "final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court [is] subject to judicial review." 3 4 Therefore, where the
agency action is not expressly made reviewable by the statute, a
court will generally deny review on. the basis of lack of ripeness,
or more broadly, untimeliness, unless the court finds final agency
action. Thus, in the administrative law context, a finding of final
agency action is crucial to surviving the ripeness doctrine, or
more broadly, timeliness, and thus, to obtaining judicial review.
The watershed case interpreting the concept of ripeness with
respect to federal agency action is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.35
29. See generally, B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 8.1-9.9 (1984); K.C.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, §§ 20.01-21.08 (1972); R.J. PIERCE, S.A.
SHAPIRO & P.R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7 (1985).
30. Ripeness is established by showing that significant hardship will result if
judicial review is denied and that the issues presented constitute questions of
law, as opposed to questions of fact, and are therefore fit for judicial resolution.
Fitness for judicial review generally requires that the agency action is final be-
cause the courts are unwilling to interfere in the administrative process until the
agency action or decision has taken a final and concrete form. Similarly, the
courts will generally refuse judicial review where plaintiff has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § § 9.1; 8.5, 8.8-
8.9; 8.30 (1984).
31. For a discussion of what constitutes final agency action, see infra notes
48-58 and accompanying text.
32. The exhaustion of the administrative remedies rule requires a plaintiff
to seek redress from the agency itself before resorting to the courts. This pre-
vents undue interference by the courts in the administrative process and unnec-
essary judicial review where administrative relief is available. However, it should
be noted that the courts apply this rule in a discretionary fashion. A court may
waive the exhaustion requirement, for example, where the injury is severe and
irreparable or where it is clear that exhaustion would be futile because the
agency has declared that no such relief will be given. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW §§ 8.30-8.31 (1984).
33. For example, ripeness may be defeated by a finding of no final agency
action or a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See generally R.J. PIERCE,
S.A. SHAPIRO & P.R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7 (1985).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
35. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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At issue in this case was a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulation which required pharmaceutical companies to indicate
the established scientific name of a drug every time it used the
drug trade name in labeling and print advertising.3 6 The pharma-
ceutical company plaintiffs sought and received from the United
States District Court of Delaware a declaratory judgment that the
regulation was invalid.3 7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed on the basis that the challenge was not
ripe.3 8 The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and set
forth definitive guidelines on what constitutes final agency action
for the purpose of obtaining judicial review under the APA.3 9
First, the Court laid down general propositions relating to
the propriety of judicial review of administrative agency deci-
sions.40 The Court began its analysis on the premise that Con-
gress intended the APA to cover a "broad spectrum of
administrative actions" and that the APA's "generous review pro-
visions" should be given a "hospitable interpretation."' 4 1 The
Court held that judicial review should be restricted only where
there was "clear and convincing evidence" of contrary legislative
intent.42 The Court stated that the rationale underlying the ripe-
ness doctrine is to "protect.. . agencies from judicial interference
until an administrative decision has been formalized and its ef-
fects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." 43 Possible
hardship to parties which would result from withholding judicial
review should also be considered in determining ripeness. 44 The
Court held that where the issue presented is fit for judicial resolu-
tion and where the agency action will require an immediate and
significant change in the plaintiff's conduct, judicial review under
36. Id. at 137-38.
37. Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964).
38. Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965). The
Third Circuit reversed without reaching the merits. The court held that pre-
enforcement review was unauthorized under the statutory scheme of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988), and, therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court. The Third Circuit also held that
relief was unavailable under section 10 of APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-704, because no
case or controversy existed at the time of the challenge. Id.
39. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. 149-56.
40. d. at 140-41.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)).
43. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148-49.
44. Id. at 149. For a discussion of hardship to the parties, see infra note 63
and accompanying text.
1991] 233
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the APA must be permitted. 45
An issue is fit for judicial resolution if the issue is a legal issue
and if the regulation constitutes final agency action.46 The
Supreme Court further clarified these two elements. Where the
challenger contends that the agency action was taken in contra-
vention of statutory authority, that is, the agency misconstrued
the statute, the issue is a legal one.47 The Court refrained from a
similarly clear-cut definition of final agency action. Instead, it
looked to case law and established a flexible definition. 48 Exam-
ples of final agency action include the following: a regulation
promulgated by agency order where compliance causes injury
that is cognizable by a court of equity;49 an order which has no
authority except to give notice of how the agency interprets its
Act and which has effect only if a particular action is eventually
brought against a particular defendant;50 and a regulation which
announces policy that any agency will restrict licensing even
though no specific application which would be the recipient of
such restriction is before the agency. 5' Based on its liberal inter-
pretation of final agency action, the Court upheld pre-enforce-
ment review of the FDA regulation in Abbott Laboratories.52
Additional support for liberal interpretation of the final
agency action requirement is found in Columbia Broadcasting System,
45. Id. at 153.
46. Id. at 149-50.
47. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149.
48. Id. at 149-50.
49. Id. at 150 (citing Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,
316 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1942)). In Columbia Broadcasting, plaintiff had challenged
FCC regulations promulgated by an order which required the FCC to refuse to
grant a license to any broadcasting station which entered into certain specific
types of contracts with a broadcasting network. 316 U.S. at 408. Plaintiff con-
tended that the regulations impaired contractual relations with broadcasting sta-
tions as well as its ability to carry on its nationwide broadcasting network. Id. at
408.
50. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 150 (citing Frozen Foods Express v.
United States, 351 U.S. 40, 45 (1956)). In Frozen Foods, plaintiff sought to enjoin
an Interstate Commerce Commission order classifying specific commodities
transported by plaintiff as nonexempt from permit requirements. 351 U.S. at
42.
51. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151 (citing United States v. Storer Broad-
casting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 198 (1956)). In Storer Broadcasting, respondent chal-
lenged FCC rules which prohibited the granting of broadcasting licenses to any
applicant who already owned multiple stations. 351 U.S. at 193. Respondent
argued that these rules conflicted with the FCC's statutory mandates to grant
broadcasting licenses where the public interest would be served and to provide
applicants with a hearing before denial of an application. Id. at 195.
52. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 156.
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Inc. v. United States.53 There the Court noted that "[tihe particular
label placed on the agency's action is not determinative of a fed-
eral court's authority to review, for it is the substance of what the
agency has purported to do and has done which is decisive." '54
In Toilet Goods Association, Inc. v. Gardner,55 the Court applied
the Abbott Laboratories two-fold inquiry and found that judicial re-
view was unwarranted. 56 In this case the Court recognized that
the issue of whether the regulation exceeded the agency's statu-
tory authority was a purely legal issue. 57 The Court also con-
cluded that the challenge related to final agency action because it
was formally promulgated after notice and comment. 58 Despite
these findings, the Court concluded that the two-fold inquiry was
outweighed by other considerations.
Specifically, the regulation in question served as notice that
the agency Commissioner may order inspections of cosmetic
manufacturing facilities, and that agency certification of cosmetic
additives may be denied if inspections are refused by cosmetic
manufacturers. 59 At the time of this pre-enforcement suit,
therefore, a court had no way to determine whether or when in-
spections would actually be ordered or what reasons the Commis-
sioner might give to justify an inspection.60 Without this
knowledge, the Court could not determine whether the regula-
tion was justified by statutory authority. 61 A specific application
of the regulation would be required to make this determination. 62
53. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
54. Id. at 416. Seesupra note 49.
55. 387 U.S. 158 (1967). Cosmetic manufacturers and distributors brought
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of the Food and Drugs Adminis-
tration. Plaintiff argued that the Commissioner had exceeded his statutory au-
thority, which had been delegated by the Secretary, by promulgating regulations
which allowed the agency to suspend certification for the manufacture of color
additives where a manufacturer refused to permit agency inspection of facilities.
Id. at 159-62.
56. Id. at 160-61.
57. Id. at 163.
58. Id. at 162.
59. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. at 163.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Court stated that statutory justification would depend on
whether Congress refused to include specific authorization for inspections in the
Act and on whether the statutory scheme in general justified promulgation of
the regulation. Id. Consideration of the latter, in turn, would depend on such
factors as an understanding of the kinds of enforcement problems encountered
by the FDA, the need for such agency supervision to accomplish the goals of the
Act, and the safeguards utilized to protect trade secrets. Id. at 163-64. The
1991] 235
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In addition, the Court found that the degree and nature of the
regulation's present effect on plaintiffs did not constitute suffi-
cient hardship to warrant judicial review because plaintiffs' pri-
mary conduct would not be affected and no irremediable adverse
consequences would result from requiring the challenge to be
predicated on an inspection refusal, that is, on specific application
of the regulation. 63 Most importantly, the Supreme Court noted
that the penalty for noncompliance with the regulation would be
a suspension of certification services. 64 This suspension could
then be challenged through an administrative procedure. 65 Thus,
the Court rejected judicial review where administrative remedies
had not been exhausted. 66
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,67 the environmental or-
ganization challenged the validity of the land withdrawal review
program carried out by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM).68 The purpose of this program is to manage public land
use. Acting pursuant to this program, the BLM engaged in a sys-
tematic review of federally-owned lands which led to cancellation
of protective classifications of public lands, particularly those
which prohibited mining and/or mineral leasing.69 As a result of
court stated that judicial consideration of these factors would be more firmly
grounded in the context of a specific application of the regulation than on the
basis of a generalized challenge. Id. at 164.
63. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. at 164.
64. Id. at 164-65.
65. Id. at 165.
66. Id.
67. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
68. Id. at 3179. Section 202 of the FLPMA requires the BLM to develop
land use plans for all public lands, regardless of previous classifications and/or
withdrawals. 43 U.S.C. § 1712. Thus, the BLM is authorized to modify existing
classifications and to revoke withdrawals. Id. This authority is implemented by
way of regulations which specifically define the land use plans mandated by
FLPMA as Resource Management Plans. Id. In 1981, the BLM engaged in a
systematic review of classifications and withdrawals as part of its land withdrawal
review program. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 308-09
(D.C. Cir. 1987). See also Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3179. The Bureau of Land Man-
agement, a subagency of the Department of Interior, is charged with land man-
agement responsibilities in accordance with comprehensive guidelines set forth
in the FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784. These guidelines include procedures
for the development, maintenance, and revision of land use plans. FLPMA
§§ 210-214, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1723.
69. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 309.
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this program, substantial public lands (160 million of 167 million
acres reviewed under the program) were opened to a variety of
previously prohibited or restricted activities and uses. 70 In addi-
tion to the reclassifications, BLM revoked withdrawals covering
20 million acres. 7 1 National Wildlife Federation (NWF) alleged
that these BLM actions violated NEPA72 and the FLPMA. 73
National Wildlife Federation sought declaratory relief stating
that the land withdrawal review program violated the above-men-
tioned applicable law.74 NWF also sought an order reinstating all
pre-program classifications and withdrawals and enjoining any ac-
tion inconsistent with those designations. 75 A preliminary injunc-
tion for these purposes was also sought. 76
70. Id.
71. Id.
Some historical background regarding federal public land management pol-
icy should be noted. Until the mid-1900's, federal policy consisted largely of
disposal. Id. at 307. Up until this time, the government transferred ownership
of vast acreages to private citizens, states, counties, cities and companies for var-
ious purposes including homesteading and railroad construction. Id. In the
1930's, the federal government shifted its policy away from disposal and toward
retention and management. Id. These new objectives were accomplished by
classifications and withdrawals. Id. Classifications designate public lands for re-
tention and frequently segregate the lands from disposal laws. Id. Withdrawals
directly remove designated lands from disposal. Id. Thus, reclassification and
revocation of withdrawals expose protected lands to disposal and the operation
of the public land law. Id. at 307.
72. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 309. In section 101 of NEPA,
Congress states its environmental policy and goals:
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government... to use all
practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster
and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and ful-
fill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331.
73. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 309. NWF alleged that the pro-
gram violated several provisions of FLPMA. Id. First, it alleged that the Depart-
ment of Interior (Department) violated its duties under FLPMA by failing to
prepare plans in connection with its withdrawal revocations and classification
terminations. Id. See also FLPMA § 202, 43 U.S.C. § 1712. Second, NWF al-
leged that the Department "violated FLPMA by revoking withdrawals and termi-
nating classifications ... without prior submission of a recommendation to the
President or the Congress." National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 309. See also
FLPMA §§ 202, 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1712, 1714. NWF also alleged that "the De-
partment violated FLPMA by failing to provide any opportunity for public in-
volvement in the Department's land status decisions." National Wildlife
Federation, 835 F.2d at 309. See also FLPMA § 202(0, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(o.
74. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 309.
75. Id.
76. Id.
1991] 237
11
O'Donnell: New Restrictions in Environmental Litigation: Standing and Final
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
238 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
B. Procedural History77
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a preliminary injunction, suspending all post-program
classification terminations and withdrawal revocations and en-
joining the agency from taking further action inconsistent with
pre-program land use designations. 78
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia affirmed the preliminary injunction. 79 The
court held that NWF had representational standing and had ade-
quately exhausted administrative remedies.80 Finally, the court
held that the injunction was supported by the district court's de-
termination of NWF's likelihood of success on the merits as well
as by other factors. 8'
77. A complete and encapsulated summary of the procedural history is as
follows: The district court granted a preliminary injunction. National Wildlife
Federation v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985). The district court
denied reconsideration of its issuance of the preliminary injunction. National
Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986). The court of
appeals upheld the preliminary injunction. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d
at 327. The court of appeals denied defendants' petition for rehearing and
ordered the parties and the district court to proceed with litigation. National
Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. National Wildlife
Federation v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988). The court of appeals
reversed and remanded. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422
(D.C. Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court reversed. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, -U.S.-, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
78. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. at 279.
The district court found substantial likelihood of success on the merits in
regard to NWF's allegations that the Department had violated its duties under
FLPMA by failing to prepare plans in connection with its withdrawal revocations
and classification terminations and that FLPMA violations had been committed
when the Department failed to provide opportunity for public involvement in
the land status changes. Id. at 277-78. Additionally, the court found that NWF
members would be irreparably injured by the agency's lifting of protective land
restrictions. Id. at 278-79. Harm to third parties (i.e., potential purchasers, les-
sees, etc. of the public lands) was determined to be insufficient to justify denial
of the injunction. Id. at 279. Finally, the court concluded that the injunction
was in the public interest. Id. at 280.
This represents the preliminary injunction as modified after the agency
moved for clarification of the injunction. See National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,
676 F. Supp. at 284-86.
79. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 327.
80. Id. at 312-18. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of representational standing. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
text for further discussion of the exhaustion of administrative remedies
principle.
81. Id. at 319-27. Other factors considered by the district court were the
threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff, the possibility of substantial harm to
other parties which would result from issuance of the injunction and the public
interest. Id. at 318-27.
[Vol. 11: p. 227
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The case again came before the D.C. Circuit court on peti-
tion for rehearing.82 The court of appeals denied the petition and
directed the parties and the district court to proceed with
litigation.83
The district court granted the agency's motion for summary
judgment, holding that NWF lacked standing8 4 NWF appealed
and the court of appeals held that its prior determination that
NWF had standing sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss ac-
ted as law and, therefore, the district court was bound to that de-
termination for purposes of ruling on summary judgment.85
Thus, the court held that summary judgment was precluded by
the existence of material issues of fact as to whether affidavits of
NWF members had demonstrated injury-in-fact in sufficient detail
to grant NWF standing.86 In short, the district court was required
to consider the case on its merits.8 7
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 8 and reversed the
court of appeals.8 9 The Court found that the affidavits, upon
which the association based its representational standing, failed
to sufficiently demonstrate that the NWF members' interests were
actually affected by the agency actions taken under the land with-
drawal review program.90 The Court also addressed the issue of
final agency action.9' The majority concluded that the program
did not constitute final agency action for the purposes of judicial
review under the APA. 92 In the absence of standing and final
agency action, judicial review was unwarranted.
The court also found that the injunction did not impermissibly affect the
rights of absent third parties, but this holding is not relevant for purposes of this
Casenote. For further discussion of this holding, see id. at 315-16.
82. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 890.
84. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C.
1988).
85. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 432-33 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
86. Id. at 430-31.
87. Id.
88. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185.
89. Id. at 3194.
90. Id. at 3187-88.
91. Id. at 3185-86.
92. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-86. Lujan is a 5-4 decision with Justices Black-
mun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissenting. Justice Scalia authored the ma-
jority opinion. Id. at 3177.
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In its discussion of standing, the Court reasoned that the two
NWF affidavits failed to identify specific lands used by the affi-
ants.93 This failure resulted in missing facts, particularly whether
affiant used the adversely affected lands, which a court is not free
to presume for the purpose of determining standing under the
APA. 94 Injury could not be sufficiently established unless the affi-
ant identified use of a specific land which was subject to the
agency action at issue. 95
It is well-settled that without injury, there is no standing.96
Similarly, it is well-settled that for purposes of obtaining judicial
review under the APA, a plaintiff must demonstrate injury of a
kind which the statute seeks to protect against.97 The majority
concluded that the imprecision by which the NWF affidavits were
characterized resulted in failure to establish injury for purposes of
APA judicial review.98 The Court discounted its holding in
SCRAP, by limiting it to its facts.99 It further distinguished SCRAP
on the basis that it involved a motion to dismiss on the pleadings
which requires less specificity with regard to alleged injury as op-
93. Id. at 3188.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3187-88. The first affidavit read as follows:
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particu-
larly those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming
have been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the unlawful
actions of the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the South
Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming has been opened to the staking
of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the
aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands.
Id. at 3187 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a).
The second affidavit was identical to the first except that the affiant asserted
use of land in the vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, the Arizona Strip and
the Kaibab National Forest. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 187a).
It should be noted that NWF submitted four supplemental affidavits after
the hearing on the summary judgment motion. These affidavits would presuma-
bly have satisfied the pleading requirements with respect to standing as set forth
by the majority. However, the majority affirmed the appellate court's holding
that these affidavits were untimely. The majority concluded that the district
court's refusal to admit these supplemental affidavits did not constitute abuse of
discretion under the APA because the affidavits were untimely under the appli-
cable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, the court was not com-
pelled to admit them. Id. at 3191-93. See infra note 121 for the dissenting
justices' position on the untimeliness of these affidavits.
96. See e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envd. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59 (1978) (holding that plaintiff must establish personal stake in outcome to
demonstrate standing. This requires showing of distinct and palpable injury
caused by challenged conduct).
97. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186.
98. Id. at 3189.
99. Id.
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/9
LUJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION2
posed to a motion for summary judgment which requires greater
specificity. 100
As noted above, the Court also reasoned that agency action
taken pursuant to an informal program, that is, a program which
the agency has not set forth in a formal policy, does not constitute
final agency action. 01 Instead, final agency action is limited to
action taken pursuant to a specific regulation or order promul-
gated by the agency.' 02
Thus, according to the Court agency programs areper se non-
reviewable. They can be challenged only in a piecemeal fashion,
and only when an action resulting from that program can be di-
rectly traced to a specific agency regulation or order.103 Accord-
ing to the Lujan court, flaws in agency programs should be
redressed by the administrative agency itself or by Congress; such
flaws are outside the scope of the courts.' °4 The Court describes
this program as "the continuing (and thus constantly changing)
operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation appli-
cations and the classifications of public lands and developing land
use plans as required by the FLPMA."' 0 5
D. Critical Analysis
1. Standing
The standing requirements in Lujan seem to be inconsistent
with previous precedent in environmental law.' 06 As noted
above, SCRAP held that affiant use of the surrounding area which
100. Id.
101. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
102. Id. In a footnote to its opinion, the majority states:
If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some par-
ticular measure across-the-board to all individual classification termina-
tions and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final ...
it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely
affected - and the entire 'land withdrawal review program,' insofar as
the content of that particular action is concerned, would thereby be
affected. But that is quite different from permitting a generic challenge
to all aspects of the 'land withdrawal review program,' as though that
constituted a final agency action.
Id. at 3189 n. 2 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 3189-90.
104. Id. at 3190.
105. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
106. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 15-28 and accompanying
text. These cases hold that injury-in-fact is established for purposes of the APA
where use of lands or surrounding lands is asserted.
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was subject to the agency action was sufficiently specific for pur-
poses of establishing standing.10 7 It may be possible, however, to
limit the significance of the Lujan holding regarding standing. To
overcome this new obstacle, environmental associations simply
must assert use of specific lands in their complaints, rather than
using the previously acceptable "in the vicinity of" language.
Thus, this holding will not necessarily be significantly trouble-
some to environmental plaintiffs in the long term. However,
where an environmental organization plaintiff is unable to locate
a member who can allege use of the specific area in question or
where the adverse environmental impact caused by the agency ac-
tion is widespread or diffuse, the Lujan holding may create an in-
surmountable obstacle. It also creates an aura of doubt with
regard to the certainty of how allegations must be worded which
could discourage future suits in the environmental area. Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court could conceivably change the rules
again, thus rendering the Lujan requirements insufficient.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the statutes to support the
contention that standing should be limited in this way.108 Indeed,
environmental legislation traditionally provides for and encour-
ages public participation and private citizen enforcement. 0 9
Thus, it is questionable whether the Court's holding is consistent
with Congressional intent.1o
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun refutes the ma-
jority's effort to distinguish the SCRAP holding."' He concedes
that the showing as to standing which is required to overcome a
summary judgment is more extensive than that required to over-
come a motion to dismiss.' 12 When a motion for summary judg-
107. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669.
108. FLPMA §§ 102(a)(5), (6), 202(f), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5), (6), 1712(f).
Section 102(a)(5) of the FLPMA provides for participation of the public in the
administration of public land statutes. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5). Section 202(f)
requires participation of the public in the formulation of agency plans and pro-
grams. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f). Section 102(a)(6) expressly provides for judicial
review of public land adjudication decisions. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(6). Thus, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be involved in the land manage-
ment process.
109. See supra note 108. See also, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act provides for private citizen suits against pol-
luters and the federal agency authorized to enact the statute. Id.
110. See supra notes 108-09.
111. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3195.
112. Id. Justice Blackmun states that "the difference between the two is
that evidence is required in the summary judgment context whereas the litigant
may rest upon the allegation in his complaint in the context of a motion to dis-
miss." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
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ment is made, conclusory allegations which are unsupported by
specific evidence are insufficient to establish the genuine issue of
fact requisite to denial of summary judgment." 3 Justice Black-
mun, however, concludes that the NWF affidavits were adequate
to defeat a motion for summary judgment." 4 This conclusion is
effectively supported by the fact that the "affidavits .. .were...
sufficiently precise to enable Bureau of Land Management offi-
cials to identify the particular termination orders to which the affi-
ants referred."" 5 Furthermore, the affiants averred that their
recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands were ad-
versely affected by the agency's classification terminations." 6
Thus, Justice Blackmun found that particularly in view of the well-
settled principle that in the summary judgment context, the facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, the evidence presented to the district court
was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to NWF's standing
to sue.'
17
Finally, Justice Blackmun concluded that identification of the
affected lands by specifically naming the parcel was unnecessary
for standing purposes.' 8 The affidavits, when read as a whole,
clearly identified the lands as those which were newly opened to
increased mining.1 9 Justice Blackmun pointed out that the BLM
repeatedly referred to the area at issue using the same language
that the NWF affiant used in her affidavit.' 20 Thus, contrary to
the majority's contention, the complaint and affidavits did not re-
quire the court to "presume facts" to determine reviewability
under the APA.'21
113. See id. (citing May v. Department of the Air Force, 777 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1985); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,
766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1985); Maldonado v. Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 51 (3d
Cir. 1985); Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir.
1985)).
114. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3195-96.
115. Id. at 3196.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3194-95.
118. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3196.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
It should be noted that Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that four supplemental affidavits submitted by NWF which presuma-
bly would have satisfied the majority's pleading requirements with respect to
standing were properly rejected by the district court on the basis of untimeliness
because they were submitted after the hearing on the summary judgment mo-
tion. Justice Blackmun characterized the untimeliness conclusion as an abuse of
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Justice Blackmun also found sufficient record evidence to
support NWF's asserted injury. He was persuaded that the
agency actions would, in fact, lead to increased mining on for-
merly protected public lands resulting in environmental damage,
thereby diminishing recreational use of those public lands. 122
Justice Blackmun concluded that the affidavits created a genuine
issue of fact as to the organization's injury. 123
2. Final Agency Action
The majority characterizes the agency's land withdrawal re-
view program as agency actions which fail to satisfy the APA re-
quirement for final agency action. 124 The Court states that the
entire program, which consists of more than a thousand individ-
ual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, cannot
be challenged by NWF on the basis of members who assert use of
lands relating to only a few of those terminations/revocations.125
In addition, the Court implies that NWF is not entitled to chal-
lenge even those few terminations/revocations before the agency
grants a mining permit.' 26 The Court labels the agency actions
identified in the NWF affidavits as "rules of general applicability
discretion on the ground that NWF showed adequate cause for its failure to file
the affidavits prior to the hearing. Additionally, Justice Blackmun concluded
that the late filing did not disserve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that
the delay caused the government no prejudice. Id. at 3196-97.
122. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3194-95.
123. Id. at 3196.
124. Id. at 3189-91. Section 10(c) of the APA provides the following:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judi-
cial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action
or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of
the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by stat-
ute, agency action otherwise final is final for purposes of this section
whether or not there has been presented or determined an application
for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that action meanwhile
is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
5 U.S.C. § 704.
The right to review is set forth in section 10(a): "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
125. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-90.
126. See id. at 3190-91 n. 3. In a footnote, the majority indicates that the
right to review would not occur until the agency granted a mining permit be-
cause it would only be at that time that it would be possible to determine that
mining would, in fact, occur. Id. Thus, at that point, injury would be sufficiently
established. Id.
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... announcing... the agency's intent to grant requisite permis-
sion for certain activities .. ,"127 Thus, the Court cautions that
individual terminations/revocations would not be ripe for chal-
lenge "until some further agency action or inaction more immedi-
ately harm[ed] the plaintiff .... "12 The Court recognizes that
this reasoning, which limits challenges to a case-by-case ap-
proach, leads to a frustrating result for environmental organiza-
tions because of their customary objective of across-the-board
protection of the environment.1 29 But the Court maintains that
this reasoning is consistent with tradition, that is, the courts may
intervene only when "a specific 'final agency action' has an actual
or immediately threatened effect." 30
Although the Court's reasoning may be technically valid, it
can reasonably be characterized as somewhat myopic and possibly
inconsistent with both precedent and the spirit of APA review,
particularly with regard to environmental law. The flexible defi-
nition of final agency action set forth in Abbott Laboratories could
reasonably be interpreted as encompassing the actions taken pur-
suant to the land withdrawal review program. In that case, the
Court held that the final agency action definition extended to a
regulation that announced agency policy in regard to how the
agency would act should particular circumstances arise.' 3 '
Although the land withdrawal program is not a regulation, an
analogy can be drawn in the sense that the termina-
tions/revocations clearly announce the agency's policy and intent
to open up previously protected lands to mining activities. Thus,
the land withdrawal review program acts as a regulation; the
agency is taking regulatory action in regard to protected federal
lands by reclassifying them. As Columbia Broadcasting System set
forth, it is the substance of the action, not its label, that is deter-
minative of the propriety of judicial review. 132 Thus, it would be
fair to characterize the land withdrawal review program as final
agency action for purposes of review under the APA.
This argument is further supported by the Court's holding in
Abbott Laboratories that judicial review should be restricted only
where there is "clear and convincing evidence" of a contrary leg-
127. Id. at 3190.
128. Id
129. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3191.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
132. Columbia Broadcasting System, 316 U.S. at 416.
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islative intent. 3 3 The legislative intent regarding judicial review
of environmental agency actions has traditionally been broad.134
This tradition would suggest that the terminations/revocations
taken pursuant to the land withdrawal review program constitute
final agency actions which are reviewable. Relying on the Lujan
majority's own language, it can reasonably be argued that the
facts of the controversy relating to the land withdrawal review
program actions have been "fleshed out" in the form of a con-
crete action which applies the program policy to the claimant's
situation in a fashion that threatens to harm the plaintiff.'3 5 The
terminations/revocations of the protective land classifications
represent concrete actions which threaten to harm NWF mem-
bers by opening up public lands to mining and mineral leasing.
Insofar as these actions were carried out under authority con-
ferred by the FLPMA, if one of these actions contravenes the pur-
pose of the statute, then all such actions, that is, the program
itself, violates the FLPMA.' 3 6
Finally, the Court cannot legitimately rely on Toilet Goods Asso-
ciation, where the Court found judicial review unwarranted until a
specific application of the regulation occurred.' 3 7 Although the
requirement of an inspection might be viewed as analogous to the
majority's requirement of a permit grant, Toilet Goods Association
can be distinguished. In that case, administrative remedies would
be available to the plaintiff upon application of the agency regula-
tion.138 In contrast, no such remedies exist for the NWF upon the
BLM's granting of a permit. Upon that event, mining or some
other exploitive activity would proceed. These activities would
result in irremediable injury to the environment and to the NWF
affiants.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun reminds the Court that
programmatic relief is available where an agency action which
consists of a rule of general applicability is invalidated. ' 9 He
133. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 136. For a discussion of the Court's
holding, see supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
134. For further discussion, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
135. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190.
136. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
137. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 3201. Justice Blackmun states the following:
In some cases, the 'agency action' will consist of a rule of general appli-
cability; and if the plaintiff prevails, the result is that the rule is invali-
dated, not simply that the court forbids its application to a particular
individual. Under these circumstances a single plaintiff, so long as he is
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distinguishes this from the instance in which a "lawful policy is
applied in an illegal manner on a particular occasion," in which
case, the plaintiff is not entitled to challenge other applications of
the rule.' 40 After judicial review, the rule stands and only the
particular application of it is invalidated.
In Lujan,. NWF contends that the land withdrawal review pro-
gram which reclassifies federally-owned lands in order to open
these lands to exploitive activities contravenes the FLPMA. 14 1
The real injury threatened is not the loss of any particular land
parcel but the systematic destruction of vast acres of many land
areas throughout the nation. It is this result which is inconsistent
with the statute. Thus, NWF must seek programmatic relief to
forestall its injury and to show a statutory violation. In light of
this reality, for the Court to require environmental organization
plaintiffs to proceed on a case-by-case approach (i.e., by individ-
ual permit grants) effectively insulates the agency from defeat be-
cause the plaintiff will be hard-pressed to prove that any
particular permit was granted in contravention of the FLPMA. It
is the cumulative effect of the permit grants that causes the
FLPMA and NEPA violations.
In the final analysis, it appears that the majority has latched
onto the technicality that BLM actions did not arise from agency-
promulgated regulations to defeat the final agency action require-
ment for judicial review. However, the program clearly consti-
tutes an agency policy from which the terminations/revocations
flow. These terminations/revocations then lead to the threatened
injury of which NWF complains. Thus, it can be argued that reli-
ance on this technicality is, at least misguided, and perhaps
plainly inconsistent with respect to precedent and congressional
intent. In one sense, the Court's reasoning is sound because case
law has left a loophole into which this technicality fits. It is far
less clear that Congress intended this technicality to be exercised,
particularly in regard to environmental challenges which repre-
sent an area where judicial review has generally been available
based on congressional intent to provide the private citizen with a
participatory role in agency decision-making and actions.
injured by the rule, may obtain 'programmatic' relief that affects the
rights of parties not before the court.
Id.
140. Id.
141. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3182.
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3. Impact
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 142 will affect the ability of
and the manner in which environmental organizations proceed
with litigation.
The standing requirement as set forth in Lujan increases the
plaintiff's burden and sets a restrictive tone with respect to stand-
ing in the environmental litigation context. Its impact is already
apparent.
In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Department of
Health and Human Services, 143 animal rights activists brought suit
against federal agencies alleging NEPA violations on the basis of
failure to prepare environmental impact statements. 144 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agencies
on the basis that the plaintiff's complaint failed to identify specific
areas where the organization members' uses would be adversely
affected. 145 Relying on Lujan, the court stated that "averments
which state only that the declarant uses unspecified portions of a
large metropolitan area, on some portions of which hazardous
substances might be transported or disposed" were insufficient to
overcome summary judgment. 146 The court was unwilling to pre-
sume that the areas which would be affected by the transportation
and disposal of hazardous substances were the same areas used
by the organization's members. 147
The district court of Hawaii looked to Lujan in the prelimi-
nary injunction context in Greenpeace USA v. Stone. 148 In this case,
the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Army from transporting nerve gas munitions from its storage
sites in West Germany to a United States territory located in the
Pacific Ocean approximately 800 miles from Hawaii for dispo-
sal.' 49 In its denial of a preliminary injunction, the court stated
142. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
143. 917 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1990).
144. Id. at 16. Plaintiffs alleged that the federal agencies' awards of re-
search grants to animal research institutions would result in adverse environ-
mental impacts by way of the transportation and disposal of hazardous or toxic
substances incidental to animal research. Id. at 16.
145. The complaint alleged adverse effect on members' use of the San
Francisco Bay area for recreation, aesthetic and health purposes. Id. at 16.
146. Id. at 16.
147. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 917 F.2d at 17.
148. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
149. Id. at 752. The disposal plan arose out of a 1986 agreement between
President Reagan and West Germany to remove these munitions pursuant to a
mandate by Congress that all chemical weapons be destroyed. Id.
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that Lujan imposed more restrictive requirements in establishing
standing under NEPA.' 50 The court noted that Lujan was not
controlling in the preliminary injunction context as well as the
fact that this case was unique in that the challenged federal action
spanned the globe. 15' Nevertheless, the court found that the in-
ternational organization's members' allegations of injury result-
ing from the transoceanic shipment of chemical weapons were
insufficient to establish standing. 52 The court stated that it was
impossible to determine whether any of the plaintiff members
were in the vicinity which would be affected by the shipment be-
cause the route had not yet been fixed. The court stated that
"[i]n light of the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on actual in-
jury in Lujan ... there is a serious question as to whether plaintiffs
have standing to challenge the transoceanic portion of the de-
fendant operation."15 3
In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duf-
fryn Terminals, Inc.,154 environmental organizations brought suit
under the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs alleged violations of a Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit.' 55 The
Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs after concluding that the plaintiffs had established stand-
ing. 156 However, a concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge
Aldisert is significant. In his concurrence, Judge Aldisert ex-
pressed concern that the court's decision will not survive
Supreme Court review after Lujan despite the fact that there was
no question that the defendant had flagrantly and continuously
violated its permit.' 5 7 Judge Aldisert appealed to the Court to
relax standing requirements in regard to environmental cases but
150. Id. at 756.
151. Id.
152. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 756.
153. Id. at 757. The court also relied on the Ninth Circuit's requirement of
some geographical nexus to the federal action. Id.
154. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter PIRG].
155. Id. at 69. Section 301 (a) of the Clean Water Act requires that all per.-
sons who discharge pollutants into navigable waters obtain a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit which sets the levels at which
pollutants may be lawfully discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a).
156. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 70-73. Plaintiff asserted generally in its complaint
that its members resided in the vicinity of or owned property on or near the
body of water into which the defendant was unlawfully discharging pollutants.
Id. at 71. In supporting affidavits, affiants stated that they used the shores of the
body of water for various recreational purposes and that they would use the
water itself for recreational purposes if it were cleaner. Id.
157. Id. at 84-85.
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sensed that Lujan indicates that the Court has moved in a different
direction. s5 8 He characterized the case as sending a "strong sig-
nal" that the Court may be unwilling to relax standing require-
ments in environmental cases. 159 The Court's refusal to accept
general averments of injury led Judge Aldisert to question
whether these environmental plaintiffs alleged injury sufficient to
establish standing under Lujan.' 6° Judge Aldisert cautiously
joined the majority with "qualms that are soothed somewhat by
the notion that the evolving precepts of standing are perhaps ex-
panded a bit when at stake are the great public policy considera-
tions of insults to our environment."'16 1
These recent cases reveal that Lujan is already having an im-
pact on the conferral of standing by the lower courts in environ-
mental cases. It should be noted that to some extent, this
obstacle is surmountable. In the future, an organization must
simply assert use by its members of specific lands or waters sub-
ject to the agency action at issue. In those instances, where the
organization can locate individuals who can aver such use of spe-
cific sites, the Lujan standing obstacle will be overcome. How-
ever, where no such individuals can be found or where the nature
of the environmental injury resulting from the agency action is
widespread or diffuse, Lujan will present an insurmountable ob-
stacle and preclude challenge.
Similarly, the Court's ruling on final agency action is signifi-
cant. In Lujan, the Court has rendered any action which does not
directly arise from an agency-promulgated regulation nonreview-
able, thus creating a loophole through which agencies can suc-
cessfully avoid judicial review. After Lujan, by taking action
pursuant to a program rather than a regulation, an agency can
escape judicial review of its decision-making policies and actions.
In a recent decision, Sierra Club v. Yeutter,' 62 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed and vacated a
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado.' 63 The environmental organization plaintiff alleged
that the Secretary of Agriculture violated his statutory duties
under the Wilderness Act by failing to claim federally reserved
158. Id. at 84.
159. Id.
160. PIRG, 913 F.2d at 84-85.
161. Id. at 89.
162. 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 1407-08.
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water rights in certain Colorado wilderness areas. 164 The court of
appeals relied on Lujan as supporting authority. 165 The court
found the cases similar because both involved "challenges to the
cumulative effect of numerous agency actions .. . [and] conjec-
tural or speculative harms ... ."166 Under Lujan, the court held
that the failure to reserve water rights did not constitute final
agency action which was ripe for review. 167 Based on this finding,
the court dismissed the appeal, vacated the judgment and re-
manded with directions to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it was not ripe. 16 8 Thus, it is apparent that Lujan has had and
will continue to have a restrictive impact on environmental litiga-
tion. It should be noted that this technicality will not necessarily
totally insulate an agency from review. But it will certainly limit
review; a program as a whole is unchallengeable. This case-by-
case approach may prove to be prohibitively expensive to envi-
ronmental organizations and interested private citizens. As noted
above, a case-by-case approach may preclude success where it is
the cumulative effect of a policy, e.g., many termina-
tions/revocations, which renders the policy statutorily invalid. Fi-
nally, such an approach is ineffective in the accomplishment of
the across-the-board environmental objectives that are character-
istic of environmental organizations.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Lujan, to establish standing, environmental organiza-
tions must allege injury by asserting use of specific lands. Addi-
tionally, agency policy that is not carried out pursuant to agency-
promulgated regulations is insulated from judicial review except
to the extent that it can be reached in regard to a specific concrete
action arising from an agency-promulgated regulation on a case-
by-case approach. In Lujan, the Court has sent a message which
deviates from precedent and may not be consistent with congres-
sional intent with regard to APA reviewability of administrative
agency actions in the area of environmental legislation.
Lynn Robinson O'Donnell
164. Id. at 1408. Plaintiff claimed that the omissions violated 16 U.S.C.
§ 526 (1988). Id.
165. Id. at 1420-21.
166. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1421.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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